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Kentucky Penal Code:
The Culpable Mental States
and Related Matters
By

ROBERT

G.

LAwsON*

Introduction
All efforts to improve the criminal law of this commonwealth
prior to 19729 were directed toward relatively narrow problems.
Legislative changes in the law had been made from time to time,
almost always without conscious regard for the maimer in which
related principles were affected. Defects of considerable importance resulted. The criminal law became substantially disjointed and difficult of administration. Unjust and inequitable
treatment of offenders was more prominent than its opposite.'
In some instances sanctions were clearly inadequate for the type
of behavior sought to be controlled.2 In others they were grossly
disproportionate to the social harms used to justify their imposition.' Many crimes which bad come into being through piecemeal legislation had become obsolete through the passage of
time.4
* Acting Dean and Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.S.
1960; Berea College; J.D. 1968, University of Kentucky.
I See Lawson, Criminal Law Revision in Kentucky: Part I-Homicide and Assault, 58 Ky. L.J. 242 (1970); Lawson, Criminal Law Revision in Kentucky: Part
11-Inchoate Crimes, 58 Ky. L.J. 695 (1970).
" For example, attempt to commit murder under some circumstances carried
a maximum penalty of twelve months in jail. See Gibson v. Commonwealth, 290
S.W.2d 603 (Ky. 1956). The same limitation on penalty existed for a conviction
of conspiracy to commit murder. Ky. REv. STAT. § 437.110 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as KRS].
3 See, e.g., KRS § 433.250(2) (stealing a hog having a value of four dollarsfive years maximum imprisonment); K]RS § 433.250(4) (stealing a fowl having a
value of two dollars-five years maximum imprisonment); KRS § 435.170(1)
(shooting at another without wounding and without intent to kill-twenty-one years
maximum imprisonment).
4 See e.g., KRS § 432.090 (discrimination against person in uniform). KRS §
432.560 (bringing pauper into state or county); KRS § 433.330 (maliciously
damaging salt works); KRS § 433.510 (grazing livestock on capital grounds);
KRS §433.770 (willfully removing or damaging boundary marker).
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Other defects of equal importance resulted from a failure of
legislative action. For example, many of the crimes committed
most frequently, such as murder, robbery, larceny, and burglary,
had never been statutorily defined.' The legislature had established sanctions for such crimes but had left for the judiciary the
more difficult task of describing the types of conduct proscribed.
More significantly, major segments of the criminal law were
entirely common law in form. No effort had ever been made to
reduce the doctrines of mens rea, justification, responsibility,
complicity, etc., to statutory form. Such was the condition of this
body of law at the beginning of 1972.
In its most recent session the General Assembly attempted to
remedy these defects through the adoption of a comprehensive
penal code.6 With this effort the Legislature did not content
itself with a revision of statutes which had been previously enacted. It also codified much of the common law of crimes. The
important changes in criminal law brought about by this legislation are literally innumerable. There is one change, however,
which stands out. Without question the most significant single
accomplishment of the entire Code is the clarification that has
been provided the doctrine of mens rea.7 The confusion which
previously existed in this area of the law is not totally describable.
Its magnitude may be indicated through a listing of mental states
used to define only a small portion of Kentucky's statutory offenses:
A. Crimes Against Persons:
Willful-Murder.8
(i)
(ii) Wanton-Involuntary Manslaughter, First Degree.9
(iii) Reckless-Involuntary Manslaughter, Second Degree.' 0
of Automobile."
(iv) Negligence-Homicide by Operation
12
Rape.
Unlawfully-Statutory
(v)
3
(vi) Forcibly-Kidnapping.
5 See, e.g., KRS §§ 433.120, 433.220, 435.010, 435.020.

6 KY. AcTs ch. 385 (1972) [chapter 385 is hereinafter cited as KYPCI.
7 KYPC §§ 12-16; PRoPosED KY. REv. STAT. §§ 433B.1-010 to 433B.1-050
[hereinafter cited as [KRS]].
8 KRS § 435.010.
9 KRS § 435.022(1).
10KRS § 435.022(2).
11 KRS § 435.025.

12KRS § 435.090.
13 KRS § 435.140.
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(vii) Willfully and maliciously-Shooting and Wounding. 14
(viii) Intent-Detaining a Woman Against Her Will. 15
(ix) Willfully, knowingly and maliciously-Spreading
Slanderous Report.16
Knowingly-Fraudulently Having One Adjudged
(x)
Insane."

B. Crimes Against Property:
(i)

(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)

Willfully and maliciously-Arson. 8

Wilfully, intentionally, or maliciously-Burning
Woods. 19
20
Unlawfully-Burning Weeds.
Feloniously-Stealing from Public Building.2'
Willfully and knowingly-Mining Coal of Another.22
23
Willfully and fraudulently-Damaging Watercraft.

As one might anticipate, the judiciary has experienced substantial difficulty in its efforts to construe and apply these terms.
It is reflected in part in some of the definitions provided by the
Court of Appeals: willfully, for example, has been defined to
mean intentionally; feloniously has been defined as "proceeding from an evil heart or purpose"; 5 and, maliciously has been
defined as "the absence of legal excuse or justification."26 If used
only by lawyers, it might be arguable-though not convincinglythat these definitions are meaningful. Unfortunately their use is
not so restricted. This language is carefully inserted in jury instructions in an attempt to convey to jurors distinct ideas about
criminal behavior. No one could seriously pretend that the effort
meets with much success. When used for this purpose the definitions are scarcely more intelligible than the terms which they
define.
Other problems reflected in this list of mental states are more
obvious. Some-though used to describe moral culpability-are
KRS §435.170 (1).
15 KRS § 435.110.
16 KRS § 435.300.
17 KRS § 435.310.
Is KRS § 433.010.
19 KRS § 433.060.
20
KRS § 433.070.
21
KRS § 433.180.
22KRS § 433.270.
23
KRS § 433.320.
24
Hall v. Commonwealth, 159 S.W. 1155, 1156 (Ky. 1913).
25
Ewing v. Commonwealth, 111 S.W. 352, 355 (Ky. 1908).
26 Hall v. Commonwealth, 159 S.W. 1155 (Ky. 1913).
14
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not really states of mind. "Unlawfully" and "feloniously" are
examples. These two words are descriptive of blameworthy
conduct. And when used alone to describe the culpability of
behavior, the judiciary is obliged to add to the statutory definition
of the offense an element of mens rea. The redundancy contained
in the mental element of some crimes is another obvious difficulty.
When the term willfully has been defined to mean intentionally,
the use of "intentionally, willfully, or maliciously" as alternative
mental elements for a single crime creates an insurmountable task
of interpretation. If "maliciously" is given its most common
construction, this combination of words constitutes a double
superfluity. Finally, it should be apparent to almost anyone that
there exists in this area a needless proliferation of terms. One of
the purposes of the doctrine of mens rea-probably the most
significant one-is to provide a structure for classifying offenders
in accordance with the degree of wrongfulness of their behavior.
This purpose has been almost totally frustrated through the seemingly endless development of new types of mens rea.
In the new Code only four culpable mental states are used to
define criminal behavior. The provision which creates and defines these mental states is the major focus of this writing. It
would seem advisable at the very outset to set it forth in full:
(1) "Intentionally"-A person acts intentionally with respect
to a result or to conduct described by a statute defining an
offense when his conscious objective is to cause that result
or to engage in that conduct.
(2) "Knowingly"-A person acts knowingly with respect to
conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware that his conduct is of
that nature or that the circumstance exists.
(3) "Wantonly"-A person acts wantonly with respect to a
result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining
an offense when he is aware of and consciously disregards
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur
or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of
such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes
a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a
reasonable person would observe in the situation. A person who creates such a risk but is unaware thereof solely
by reason of voluntary intoxication also acts wantonly
with respect thereto.
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(4)

"Recklessly-A person acts recklessly with respect to a
result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining
an offense when he fails to perceive a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation
from the standard of care7 that a reasonable person would
2
observe in the situation.

In discussing the foregoing provision this article has two subparts.
In the first an attempt is made to describe in some detail the
manner in which these four states of mind are intended to function, with special attention given to the changes made in preexisting doctrine. The second consists of a discussion of the manner in which the culpable mental states function in relation to
some other parts of the new legislation. Special consideration is
given to the provision dealing with criminal causation. It is hoped
that some assistance will be provided with the interpretation and
application of this important part of the new Code when it becomes effective in July of 1974.
I.

CULPABLE STATEs OF

MiND: THm

"OLD" AND THE "NEW"

A. Introduction
For the first time the criminal law of this state has precise,
legislative definitions of the mental states used in defining crimes.

By providing these, the Code has unquestionably added clarity
to the doctrine of mens rea. In two very specific ways, however,
the new legislation does more toward this end. The first involves
an elimination of most of the "old" states of mind, a change that
can be most appropriately described as a consolidation of ideas.
Many of the terms previously used to describe mental states were
duplicative. A single attitude of mind might have been identified
by two or three different labels. As indicated above, only four
are used in the Code ("intentionally", 'mowingly", "wantonly"
and "recklessly") and each is explicitly described as a meaning.
For additional assurance that others do not creep back into the
law through judicial interpretation or future legislative action,
a provision was enacted to require one of these four mental states
27 KYPC

§ 13 [KRS § 433B.1-020].
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for every criminal offense. 8 Only one exception is made to this
requirement. Offenses which are intended to impose "absolute
liability" require no mental state. 29 This feature of the Code
should serve to eliminate a major source of prior confusion.
A second source of confusion has been removed as a consequence of definitional design. In its effort to provide more
precision than has previously existed (and following the lead of
the Model Penal Code),30 the General Assembly recognized in its
definitions three general types of offenses. For purposes of discussion they may be labeled as "result", "conduct" and "attendant
circumstance" crimes. The first consists of crimes whose sanctions
are imposed with a view toward proscribing certain socially harmful results. Homicide and arson are examples. Death is the proscribed result of the former.3 ' Burning a building is the proscribed
result of the latter.32 With offenses of this type the proscribed
result becomes the point of reference in assessing the mens reabetter still, the mental state-of an offender. The second type
consists of offenses which are designed to control undesirable
conduct, without regard to whether a socially harmful result
accompanies the conduct. An example is reckless driving of an
automobile or reckless shooting of a firearm. 33 The third type
is more limited than the second, at least in one sense. It consists
of offenses which proscribe behavior that occurs only under
certain well-delineated circumstances. The offense of knowingly
receiving stolen property is perhaps the best example.3 4 The circumstances under which an actor's conduct occurs constitute the
all-important element of this crime. In every respect the culpable
mental states of the Code explicitly reflect in their definitionsthese
basic differences in the nature of criminal offenses. And, as indicated above, those provisions which create offenses of the first
type link the culpable mental state to the "result" of an offender's
behavior; those creating offenses of the second type relate it to his
"conduct"; and those creating the third type relate the mental
state to the "attendant circumstances." Once again, ease of under28 KYPC § 14 [KRS § 433B.1-030].
29
3

Id.

0 MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 2.02 (Official Draft 1962).

31 KYPC §§ 62-65 [KRS §§ 484A.1-020 to 435A.1-0501.
S2 KYPC §§ 115-17 [KRS §§ 434B.3-020 to 434B.3-040].
3 KYPC §§ 71-72 [KRS §§ 434A.2-060 to 434A..1-050].
34 KYPC § 126 [KRS § 4340.1-0901.
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standing and application should result from this change in approach.
B. "Intentionally"and "Knowingly"
As used in the Code, probably the most significant distinction
between "intentionally" and "knowingly" is in the attitude necessary to constitute each. Before an offender can be found to have
acted "intentionally," it must be determined that he had a proscribed result or conduct as his conscious objective. His design
or his objective in acting must have been to bring about the result
or to engage in the conduct. On the other hand the quality of
mind essential to "knowingly" is awareness. An offender acts
knowingly when he has a mental awareness of the nature of his
conduct or of the existence of some attendant circumstance.
There exists a second important difference between these two
mental states. It involves the types of offenses for which each
may serve as the mental element. More specifically, "knowingly"
is defined so that it can never serve as the mental state for a crime
having a proscribed result as its essential element. The reason for
this restriction has been described as follows:
The only difference between the two that should be noted
is that the latter cannot serve as the culpable mental state for
an offense having a prohibited result as its essential element.
Two examples of this type of offense are homicide (with death
as the prohibited result) and assault (with bodily injury as
the prohibited result). For offenses of this type the distinction
between "intentionally" and "knowingly" is practically nonexistent and quite likely to result in confusion. "Knowingly",
therefore, is not employed in defining this type of offense,
5
i.e., a "result" offense.3
Neither "intentionally" nor "knowingly" has been a significant
source of past difficulty. And since the new terms are not very
different in description from their pre-existing counterparts, future
difficulty is not a very strong possibility. One point of concern,
however, deserves brief mention. As stated above, 'mowingly"
has been defined by the legislature to require mental awareness
by an offender. In providing this definition no effort was made
35 See KENTuCKY LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMISSION, KENTUCKY
CODE § 205, Commentary (Final Draft 1971) [hereinafter cited as LRC].

PENAL
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by the Legislature to deal with the endless variations in degree
which can exist with this quality of mind. As a result one problem
of some importance was generated. It can best be described
through a comparison of three distinct types of mental attitude
which are frequently asserted to constitute knowledge: (i) A
belief in the existence of a fact or circumstance which is based
on personal observation; (ii) a belief in its existence which is
based on factors other than personal observation, such as information provided by credible observers; and (iii) a suspicion that
a fact or circumstance exists, accompanied by a deliberate avoidance of information which would likely confirm or remove that
suspicion.36
No difference of opinion has existed in this country with
respect to criminal culpability for the first two beliefs. Each has
been held uniformly to constitute knowledge. On the other hand,
uniformity of opinion has not prevailed regarding criminal liability
for the third attitude. 37 In apparent anticipation of this the legislative proposal in which the Penal Code originated contained a

provision explicitly imposing liability for this state of mind. It
provided that knowledge, of a fact or circumstance essential to a
criminal conviction, "is established if a person is aware of a high
probability of its existence, unless he actually believes that it does
not exist."38
Had this provision been enacted, an individual suspicious of
the existence of a fact or circumstance, if criminal liability was to
be avoided, would have been forced to make inquiry in order to
confirm or remove the suspicion.3 9 The General Assembly, however, did not include this provision in the Code. And it provided
no substitute. As a consequence, the Court of Appeals, when
faced with this situation, will likely resolve the problem by resorting to pre-existing principles. The case of Ellison v. Common36 See R. Pnnrtns, CnmNAIL LA-w 779 (2d ed. 1969).

37 See, e.g., Woods v. State, 73 So. 129 (Ala. App. 1916); State v. Lintner,
41 P.2d 1036 (Kan. 1935); State v. Perkins, 160 So. 789 (La. 1935); State v. Drew,
124 N.W. 1091 (Minn. 1910); State v. Goldman, 47 A. 641 (N.J. 1900).
38 H.B. 197, 1972 Ky. Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. § 15(3).
39 The manner in which the provision was intended to function was explained
as follows by the drafters:
With this provision, if an individual is aware of a "highly [sic] probability" that a particular fact or circumstance exists and has not satisfied
himself of its non-existence, the element of "knowledge as to that fact
or circumstance is sufficiently established for criminality. LRC § 215,
Commentary.
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wealth 0 offers the best indication of the Court's prior position.
Although the language of the Ellison opinion is somewhat lacking
in clarity, it seems certain that the Court rejected the notion
that was presented to the legislature in the original code proposal.

While recognizing that knowledge, as a culpable mental state,
can be established by use of circumstantial evidence, the Court

held that anything less than full knowledge of a fact essential
to an offense is insufficient to support a conviction. 4 ' The inevita-

ble conclusion to be drawn from this ruling is that the third
attitude of mind described above does not constitute knowledge,
as that mental state is now defined.

C. "Wantonly" and "Recklessly"
1. Introduction
A complete understanding of "wantonly" and "recklessly," as

defined in the new legislation, is not possible without some description of the manner in which this part of the Code was altered
as it passed through the legislative process. As indicated earlier,

the Penal Code originated in the House of Representatives with
an introduction of House Bill 197. One section of this bill proposed four mental states for use in defining offenses.4 - Two of
the four were "intentionally" and "knowingly," defined in the
original bill exactly as defined in the legislation which gained

enactment. The other two were labeled as "recklessly" and "criminal negligence. 4 3 The language used to describe "recklessly"
was identical to that finally adopted by the Legislature to define
40227 S.W. 459 (Ky. 1921).
41 The difference in mental attitude required under pre-existing law and that
which would have been required under the provision rejected by the General
Assembly is indicated in this statement from the Ellison case:
[I]t has always been held that the proof of receiving goods under
circumstances that would cause a reasonable man of ordinary observation
to believe or to morally know that they were stolen constitutes evidence
from which a jury is authorized to infer and to find that the recipient
of stolen goods had full knowledge of their character, and hence a conviction of guilty knowledge may be sustained by circumstantial evidence.
227 S.W. at 461.
In other words, tinder the proposal, awareness of highly suspicious circumstances
would have been sufficient for conviction in the absence of an actual belief by an
offender contrary to the suspicion. Under the Ellison opinion, this type of mental
awareness would serve only to support an inference by the decision makers that
the offender had the requisite knowledge for conviction.
42 H.B. 197, 1972 Ky. Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. § 13(1) and (2).
43Id. at § 13(3) and (4).
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"wantonly," and definition of "criminal negligence" was identical
to that finally used for "recklessly."
Following its introduction in the House, the Penal Code was
referred to committee. The original bill was substantially revised
in committee and presented for vote in the House in the form of
a substitute bill.44 As a part of this revision the section which contained the culpable mental states was amended to provide an
entirely different definition of "criminal negligence." 45 The substitute bill was approved by the House of Representatives and
passed to the Senate for consideration.
In the Senate the Code was once again substantially changed.
The section containing the culpable mental states was amended
in three respects: (i) The definition of "criminal negligence"
which had been substituted by the House Judiciary Committee
was eliminated in favor of the one originally presented in H.B.
197; (ii) the label attached to this state of mind was changed
from "criminal negligence" to "recklessly"; and (iii) as necessitated by this second change, the label for the other state of
mind was changed from "recklessly" to "wantonly." With the
approval of these amendments, the culpability provision took its
final form and was ultimately adopted by the General Assembly.
This means that the section of the Code which defines the culpable
mental states trudged almost full circle in the legislative process.
The final product differed from the original proposal only as to
the labels used to identify two of the four states of mind.
What motivated the General Assembly to make what appears
to be an inconsequential change of labels? A complete answer
to this question is not possible and, even if it was, would be of
limited value. It is sufficient for purposes of this discussion to
emphasize that the Legislature's concern with this part of the
Code focused on the fourth culpable mental state, i.e., the one
labeled in the beginning as "criminal negligence" and in the
end as "recklessly." A more important question that is raised by
this sketch of legislative history is whether or not this change of
labels is truly inconsequential. The ultimate answer to this question
will not be provided until after the Code becomes operational.
However, it is possible at this time to make one certain prediction.
44H.B. 197 (Comm. Substitute), 1972 Ky. Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess.
Id. at § 13 (4).

45
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Because of the labels selected by the Legislature for the third and
fourth mental states, the confusion and contradiction of the pastat least in part-could easily become as much a factor in the new
doctrine of mens rea as it was in the old. If this is to be avoided,
extraordinary caution must be exercised in the use and interpretation of the new provision. The discussion which follows is
designed to generate such caution and, in addition, to encourage
a reconsideration of this part of the Code by the General Assembly
when it meets again in 1974.
2. The New Definitions
The essence of mens rea is a state of mind that is morally
blameworthy. In analyzing the new definitions of "wantonly" and
"recklessly," the search for moral blameworthiness leads almost
immediately to the conclusion that wanton and reckless offenders
suffer criminal sanctions because of purposeless behavior. Stated
more precisely, such offenders do not consciously seek to bring
about socially harmful consequences. They do not act with
purpose or design. What then is "guilt," the "culpability," the
"wrongfulness" in their conduct? What is it that justifies the
infliction of punishment on those who so engage?
All of these questions have the same answer: Wanton and
reckless offenders generate through their conduct intolerable risk
that socially harmful consequences will result. Quite appropriately, therefore, the Code defines these two mental states in
terms of risk. Under the new provision neither of the two can
suffice as the mental element for a crime unless the conduct in
question involves a substantial risk that a result or circumstance
required for commission of an offense will occur or exists.46 And
before a risk can be called substantial, it must involve extraordinary danger of harm-more than that which is ordinarily involved in common activity. As described by Professor Perkins:
Since some element of risk is involved in many kinds of
conduct, socially-acceptable conduct cannot be limited to acts
which involve no risk at all. To distinguish risks not socially
acceptable from those regarded as fairly incident to our mode

of life, the former are spoken of as "unreasonable".47
46 KYPC § 13 [KRS § 483B.1-020].
47 R. PERRKS, CASES AND MAmELmLS ON

(1972).

CmMsAi
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Though labeled as substantial,a risk is not socially unacceptable
under the Code-sufficient to constitute wantonness or reckless4 8 As stated by the drafters of
ness-unless it is also uniustifiable.
the Model Penal Code: "[E]ven substantial risks may be created
without (wantonness or) recklessness when the actor seeks to
serve a proper purpose, as when a surgeon performs an operation
which he knows is very likely to be fatal but reasonably thinks
the patient has no other, safer chance."49
In addition to the risk requirement, these two mental states
have one other common element. Neither can be shown to exist
unless the behavior in question involves a gross deviation from
the standard of conduct which a reasonable person could be
expected to observe in the same situation."0 This element is nothing more than a measuring stick, designed to provide a gauge by
which fact finders can decide in a particular case whether sanctions are warranted. The reason for this requirement was ably
explained in the Model Code:
Some principle must be articulated ... to indicate what
final judgement is demanded after everything is weighed.
There is no way to state this value-judgement that does not
beg the question in the last analysis; the point is that the jury
must evaluate the conduct and determine whether it should
be condemned. The draft, therefore, proposes that this difficulty be accepted frankly and the jury asked if the defendant's
conduct... "involves a gross deviation from proper standards
of conduct."51
If this element exists, and if the risk involved is "unreasonable,"
an offender's behavior will always constitute either wantoness or
recklessness, with the choice between the two to depend upon his
quality of mind as related to the risk embodied in his conduct.
If he is aware of that risk and consciously disregards it, he acts
wantonly; if he fails to perceive the risk, he acts recklessly.5 2 Or
as stated elsewhere, "[wanton] conduct involves conscious risk
taking, while [reckless] conduct involves inadvertent risk cre53
ation."
4

8KYPC

§ 13 [KRS § 433B.1-020].

49 MODEL PENAL CODE §

2.02, Comment 3 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).

50 KYPC § 13 [KRS § 433B.1-020].
51 MODEL PENAL CODE
52 YpC § 13 [KRS
53

§ 2.02, Comment 3 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).

§ 433B.1-020].

LRC § 205, Commentary.
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3. Pre-existing Definitions
Any substantial effort to relate the new definitions of wantonness and recklessness to previous doctrine ultimately leads to a
feeling of hopelessness. Nonetheless such an effort seems nearly
essential. In using the new mental states courts are certain to
resort to previous pronouncements about wantonness and recklessness. Sources of prior difficulty with these concepts and
changes in meaning brought about by the Code must be identified.
Perhaps, in this way, the difficulty which seems to be an unavoidable component of this part of mens rea can be managed.
Several factors contributed to the problems which existed
under previous doctrine with the mental states used to impose
sanctions upon purposeless behavior. Probably the most important
of these can be shown by reference to a couple of early statements
by the Kentucky Court of Appeals. The first is contained in a
case which involved an unintentional homicide.54 In its opinion
the Court declared that "[tjhe words 'gross carelessness' . . . are
practically equivalent to the words 'reckless and wanton.'"
The second statement was made in a later case of the same type:
"The words 'reckless,' "gross,' and 'wanton,'. . . mean utterly careless, having no regard for consequences, or for the safety of
others, but without malice." 56 As indicated by these quotations,
during a substantial part of the recent past "wantonly" and
"recklessly" were treated as synonymous with each other and also
with a third state of mind which was labeled as "gross negligence"
or "gross carelessness." Given usual interpretation each of these
terms, when compared with the other two, would seem to signify
a difference (at least in degree if not in kind) in criminal culpability, a difference in moral blameworthiness.57 Why were they
treated by the Court of Appeals as one? The answer to this question is to be found in the law of homicide. Like much of the
doctrine of mens rea this part was formulated in cases involving
homicide crimes.
Until quite recently, there existed in Kentucky only three
54

Jones v. Commonwealth, 281 S.W. 164 (Ky. 1926).

55 Id. at 167.
56

Pelfrey v. Commonwealth, 57 S.W.2d 474. 476 (Ky. 1933).
57 On the scale of moral blameworthiness, wantonness would seem to imply

greater culpability than recklessness, and recklessness would similarly imply a
greater degree of wrongfulness than gross negligence.
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recognized homicide offenses-murder, voluntary manslaughter
and involuntary manslaughter. 58 None of the three was divided
into degrees. Except in situations not relevent to this discussion,
the first two were committed only through intentional killings,
i.e., those where the offender actually wanted to cause death.
Obviously the third could be committed only through a killing
which was "unintentional," i.e., a conscious objective of causing
death was absent from the actor's state of mind. With the law of
homicide in this form, the Court of Appeals was simply not
presented with a case which required distinctions among "wantonness," "recklessness" and "gross negligence." No doubt the Court
could have seized an opportunity to distinguish the three. But it
elected not to undertake this difficult task, and chose instead to
describe the minimum culpability needed for conviction of involuntary manslaughter and to assume that states of mind having
a greater degree of culpability would naturally satisfy the requirement. In this way, and despite the fact that "wantonness"
ordinarily signifies a greater degree of blameworthiness than
"recdessness" and the latter a greater degree than "gross carelessness," the three became synonyms.
From that point in time, development of this part of the doctrine of mens rea was almost totally dependent upon changes
which were to occur in the law of homicide. Such changes came
in due time, partly from the Court and partly from the Legislature,
but always piecemeal. The first one involved the crime of voluntary manslaughter. Though the exact time is difficult to ascertain,
the Court of Appeals at some point accepted the idea that this
offense could be committed through an "unintentional" killing.59
Thereafter, two separate offenses (voluntary manslaughter and
involuntary manslaughter) provided sanctions for deaths occurring not as a conscious objective of the actor. Labeled as negli58 To be perfectly accurate, it should be pointed out that for a great many
years Kentucky has had substantially more than three homicide offenses. However,
only three of the offenses have had general application, i.e., they can be committed
without regard to the circumstances under which death occurs so long as the
offender has the required state of mind. All of the others are offenses of limited
application, meaning that death has to occur under specifically described circurnstances. See, e.g., KRS § 435.030 (homicide occurring in course of criminal syndicalism or sedition); IMS § 435.040 (homicide occurring in course of abortion):
KRS 5§ 435.060 (homicide resulting from obstruction of road).
9 See, e.g., Lambdin v. Commonwealth, 241 S.W. 842 (Ky. 1922); Terrell v.
Commonwealth, 240 S.W. 81 (Ky. 1922); Davis v. Commonwealth, 237 S.W. 24
(Ky. 1922).
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gent voluntary manslaughter,60 the new offense was defined to
require that an offender act "wantonly," "recklessly" or with "gross
carelessness.""' With these same terms then being used to describe
the mental element for involuntary manslaughter, the Court of
Appeals was forced to re-evaluate its culpability requirements
for unintentional homicides. Most of this re-evaluation occurred
in two cases.
The first was Jones v. Commonwealth,62 which involved a
death resulting from an automobile accident. In presenting this
case to a jury, the trial court gave instructions on both voluntary
and involuntary manslaughter. The defendant was found guilty
and subsequently appealed. His principal argument consisted of
an assertion that the trial court had erred in its description of the
mental elements of these offenses. For the first tine, the Court
of Appeals was forced to describe with specificity the difference
between negligent voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter. Substantial clarification of the doctrine of mens rea,
as it existed at the time of this decision, resulted from the Court's
effort.
For the express purpose of reducing confusion, the Court of
Appeals eliminated one of the mental states previously used to
impose liability for an unintentional killing: "[I]n order to avoid
tautology and confusion in definitions, we feel it well to omit the
words 'gross carelessness.' "3 The Court made it clear with this
ruling that it did not intend to break apart its package of synonyms. Its earlier position that "gross carelessness" (or "gross negligence") was not distinguishable from "recklness" and "wantonness"
was restated. The Court then moved to the matter of establishing
the mental elements for the two types of homicide. "Wantonness
or recklessness" was adopted as the culpable mental state for
negligent voluntary manslaughter; "carelessness or negligence"
(without the "gross") was established as the mental element for
involuntary manslaughter. Then, as a final step in its restatement
of this part of mens rea, the Court added a touch of clarity. It
defined the new mental element for involuntary manslaughter
60 See Fugate v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 675, 683 (Ky. 1960) (dissenting
opinion); Lambert v. Commonwealth, 377 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Ky. 1964).
61 See Davis v. Commonwealth, 237 S.W. 24, 25 (Ky. 1922).
02281 S.W. 164 (Ky. 1926).
63 Id. at 167.
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("carelessness or negligence") in exactly the same language that is
used to define negligence in tort law, i.e., in terms of an ordinary
deviation from the standard of conduct of a reasonably prudent
person under similar circumstances. 4 With this definition, phase
one of the re-evaluation of unintentional homicide came to an end.
Without question, the Jones case clarified the law of homicide.
It also clarified the doctrine of mens rea. At the same time, it
created for subsequent resolution the following policy question
of major importance: Is "ordinary negligence," as the term is used
and defined in tort law, sufficiently blameworthy to justify the
imposition of criminal sanctions? Or, stated differently, should an
individual be imprisoned or fined for ordinary inadvertent behavior? Long before this issue was squarely faced by the Court
of Appeals reluctance to use negligence as a basis for criminal
liability surfaced. 5 In fact, even in cases involving the offense
of involuntary manslaughter, the tort standard of care was not
consistently used. 66 However, not until the decision in Mayre v.
Commonwealth 7 was the issue finally resolved.
As in the Jones case, the deaths involved in Mayre resulted
from an automobile accident. The defendant's motor vehicle
left a highway and traveled into his victim's yard. Proof was
introduced to show that he was exceeding the speed limit and
traveling at night without headlights. Using an instruction which
required a finding of ordinary negligence for guilt a jury convicted the defendant of involuntary manslaughter. The Court
of Appeals reversed this decision and, in doing so, changed its
position with respect to the use of ordinary negligence:
It is our view that instructions in voluntary manslaughter
cases should require a finding of reckless and wanton conduct,
64 In its effort to clarify the two offenses under consideration in Jones v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals established a complete set of jury instructions
for cases involving unintentional homicides. One of these instructions was designed to distinguish "recklessness and wantonness" from "carelessness and

negligence":

As used in these instructions, the words "reckless" and "wanton" mean
utterly careless, having no regard for consequences or for the safety of
others, yet without malice. The words "carelessly" and "negligently"
mean the absence of ordinary care, and "ordinary care" means such care
as an ordinarily prudent person would exercise for his own protection,
under circumstances similar to those described in this case. Id.
65 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Temple, 39 S.W.2d 228 (Ky. 1931).
66
See Cares v. Commonwealth, 129 S.W.2d 543 (Ky. 1939).
67240 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1951).
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and instructions in involuntary manslaughter cases should require a finding of gross negligence in order to authorize a con68
viction (emphasis added).
With this decision the Court for the first time recognized a
distinction between "gross negligence" or "gross carelessness" on

the one band and "wantonness" and "recklessness" on the other.
A modest effort was made to explain the difference. But, in the
final analysis, the Court simply declared that there is a sound
basis for distinction and that if the terms were correctly defined
"the jury [would] have a practical working basis upon which to
render an intelligent verdict.""9 Thus ended the second phase of

the Court's effort to redefine the law of homicide, and along with

70
it, the doctrine of mens rea.
About ten years after the Mayre decision, the General Assem-

bly made its contribution to the confusion that had prevailed
with this part of mens rea. In an apparent effort to deal specifically

with the offense of negligent voluntary manslaughter, the legislature enacted a statute which created the crime of involuntary

manslaughter in the first and second degrees. 71 Wantonness was
used as the culpable mental state for the higher degree of this
offense and recklessness as the mental state for the lower degree.
Thus, two terms which had previously been treated as synonyms

were used by the legislature to define two separate and distinct
homicide offenses. The Court of Appeals was forced once again
to review this part of mens rea. It responded by formulating the

following definitions:
68 Id.

at 855.

00 Id.
70Since the decision in Mayre v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals has
not altered its position that criminal sanctions should not be imposed for negligent
conduct. At the same time, however, the Court has recognized the power of the
Legislature to create such a crime. In apparent response to the Mayre decision,
the General Assembly enacted a statute which created the crime of homicide
resulting from the negligent operation of a motor vehicle. KRS § 435.025. In
affirming a conviction under this statute, the Court of Appeals ruled that the
Legislature intended with its enactment to reinstate ordinary negligence as the
basis for criminality. Kelly v. Commonwealth, 267 S.W.2d 536 (Ky. 1954). Under
this statute, any act or omission to act which would suffice for tort liability will
suffice for criminal liability. The new Code clearly takes an opposite position. As
was stated by the drafters of the new mens rea provision when referring to the
lowest culpable mental state: "[Als an element of crime [it] is not satisfied by the
same type of inadvertent conduct that suffices for tort liability." LRC § 205, Commentary.
7 fKRS § 435.020.

KENTucKY LAw Jo

NAL[

[Vol. 61

A wanton act... is a wrongful act done on purpose in
complete disregard of the rights of others, with conscious
knowledge of and complete disregard for the probable consequences.
Reckless conduct.., is conduct done with indifference to
the rights of others, and indifference whether wrong or injury
2
will result from the act doneJ
With this language the Court distinguished wantonness from recklessness by describing the former as a purposeful act and the
latter as an indifferent act. It established finally that these two
mental states do in fact connote different degrees of moral blameworthiness. Whether or not any additional clarification to this
part of the law was provided by these definitions is questionable.
In any event they constitute the last significant judicial statement
concerning the doctrine of mens rea prior to the enactment of
3
the new Code.
In final comment on previous doctrine it is tempting to conclude that the most recent judicial definitions of wantonness and
recklessness are substantially identical to those provided by the
General Assembly. In fact, however, the differences between the
old and the new definitions are more significant than the similarities. Only two need be mentioned. First: The new provision
defines these mental states in terms of a substantial and unjustifiable risk. No mention of risk was made in the old definitions.
Yet, in every instance where sanctions were imposed for behavior
that was described as wanton or reckless, it was because of the
risk of harmful consequences contained in that behavior. Sub2

Hemphill v. Commonwealth, 379 S.W.2d 223, 227 (Ky. 1964).
This description of pre-Code doctrine leaves one important question unanswered. Following the separation of "wantonness" and "recklessness" as a consequence of legislative action, what happened to the mental state previously
labeled as "gross negligence"? An answer to this question is suggested in the case
of Smith v. Commonwealth, 424 S.W.2d 835 (Ky. 1967):
At one time "reckless" was equated with "wanton" as a characteristic
of conduct punishable as voluntary manslaughter, and gross negligence
(failure to exercise slight care) was the basis for involuntary manAs a result of the statute, KRS § 435.022, "reckless" has
slaughter ....
as less offensive than "wanton . .. Whether the demoted
been
classified
"reckless conduct"
is the same as gross negligence is a question we ax
not required here to decide. We think it enough to say that a jury would
not be expected to make much distinction between "failure to exercise
slight care," or "having little or slight regard for the safety of others," and
"indifference to the rights of others, and indifference whether wrong o
injury will result from the act done." Id. at 839.
7

73
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stantial clarity is added to this area of the law by describing the
states of mind of such offenders in terms of this risk. Second:
The old definitions of wantonness and recklessness failed to account for basic differences which exist in the character of criminal
offenses. Although these two mental states were used most
prominently in the definition of homicide crimes (which are
"result" offenses), they were described not in relation to a proscribed result but rather in relation to an actor's conduct. The
new definitions do account for this factor. In addition, they expressly reflect the fact that wantonness and recklessness are used
as the mental element for both "result" and "conduct" offenses.
Because of these differences in the "old" and the "new" terms,
and others which will be indicated in subsequent discussion, the
culpable mental states of the Code should be interpreted and
applied by the Court of Appeals without substantial reliance on
pre-existing law.
4. The Need for Legislative Reconsideration
As indicated above, the Code does not become operational
until July 1, 1974. Before that date the General Assembly will
meet in general session. When the Code was enacted and given
a deferred effective date it was obviously contemplated that additional revision of the law would be made in the next legislative
session, if necessary.74 The purpose of this part of the article is to
urge the Legislature to amend the provision of the Code containing the culpable mental states by reverting to the original
proposal. Only a change in terminology would be required, with
"recklessness" substituted for "wantonness" and "criminal negligence" substituted for "recklessness." No change in the content
of the definitions would be necessary. There are several reasons
for making this change and -nonefor not making it.
First:It becomes crystalclearupon a most cursory examination
that the third and fourth labels used in the Code (wantonly and
recklessly) have never had distinct meanings in the criminal law.
Reference to any legal dictionary confirms this conclusion. In
the one most frequently used wanton is defined as "reckless, heedless, malicious, characterized by extreme recklessness, foolhardi7

4 See H.R. 160, Ky. J. OF HoUsE- oF REP. 3790 (1972).
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ness, recklessly disregardful of the rights or safety of others or
of consequences." 75 Recklessness is defined in that same dictionary as "rashness, heedlessness; wanton conduct." 7 With reckless defined as wanton, and wanton defined as reckless, it cannot
be surprising that our own Court of Appeals for a substantial
period of time considered the two to be linguistic equivalents.7 7
In fact, at the very moment of adoption of the new Code, wantonness and recklessness were treated as synonyms in the definition
of at least one offense. 78 Because of this prior usage there is little
chance that difficulty can be avoided with the new definitions.
The risk that is involved in using both of these words to describe
culpable mental states was foreseen by one of the judges of the
Court of Appeals even prior to the enactment of the Code:
As could be readily anticipated by any one familiar with
the common law, distinguishing between wanton conduct and
reckless conduct has already caused this court some difficulty and no doubt in the future will cause considerably
79
more.

Second: wantonness, as defined in the new legislation, is employed in a sense that is different from that which it has always
had in the criminal law. When used as the mental element for an
offense, wantonness, on the scale of blameworthiness, has been
much closer to the mental state known as intention than is contemplated by the Code definition. This closeness has been
described as follows:
Wanton misconduct "is something different from negligence
however gross-different not merely in degree but in kind, and
evincing a different state of mind," so callously heedless of
harmful consequences known to be likely to follow that "even
though there be no actual intent, there is at least a willingness
to inflict injury, a conscious indifference to the perpetration
of the wrong". While an intent to do an unlawful act in
wanton disregard of the foreseen likelihood of harm may
differ little in the scale of moral blameworthiness from actual
75

BLACK'S LAW DIc'rtONAny

1753 (4th ed. 1968).

70 Id.at 1435.
77
78 Cases cited notes 55-56 supra.

See, e.g., Bentley v. Commonwealth, 354 S.W.2d 495 (Ky. 1962).
Fugate v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 675, 683 (Ky. 1969) (dissenting
opinion).
79
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intent to cause such harm it is not the same state of mind and
should not be confused therewith, although it may be permissible to characterize it as "equivalent in spirit to actual intent." 0
On occasion the Court of Appeals of Kentucky has expressly
recognized this usage of the term: "'[W]anton misconduct is
such as puts the actor in the class with the wilful doer of wrong'." " '
If one is to completely understand the relationship of the Code
definition of wantonness to the usual definition of the term, the
instances in the Code in which unintentional conduct is characterized "as equivalent in spirit" to intentional conduct must be
examined. There are only two.
The first is contained in the chapter which defines the offenses
of homicide. In these new provisions there exists a crime which2
is defined simply as the killing of another person intentionally.
It is entitled murder. There exists another offense which is defined
as the killing of another wantonly.83 This offense is called manslaughter. To commit the first an offender must consciously desire
to bring about a death; for the second he must be aware of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that death will result from his
conduct and he must consciously disregard that risk. There is in addition a third offense. This one is defined as the killing of another
wantonly and under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life.84 Lile the intentional killing, this crime is
classified as murder.
In the creation of this third homicide, the obvious purpose
of the legislature was to provide sanctions for a death involving
slightly less moral culpability than an intentional killing but more
than that involved in an "ordinary" wanton killing. The quality
of mind contemplated for this homicide was more fully explained
by the drafters of the Model Penal Code, which contained an
identical offense: 85
[T]here is a kind of [wanton] homicide that cannot fairly
be distinguished . . . from homicides committed [intentionLAw 783 (1969).
81 Mayre v. Commonwealth, 240 S.W.2d 852, 855 (Ky. 1951).
82KYPC § 62(1)(a) [KRS § 434A.1-020(1)(a)].
83 KYPC § 64 [KRS § 434A.1-0401.
84 KYPC § 62(1)(b) [KRS § 434A.1-020(1)(b)].
85 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b) (1962).
80 B. PERIUNS, CIHIMINAL
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ally]. [Wantonness] ...presupposes an awareness of the creation of substantial homicidal risk, a risk too great to be
deemed justifiable by any valid purpose that the actor's conduct serves. Since risk, however, is a matter of degree and
the motives for risk creation may be infinite in variation, some
formula is needed to identify the case where [wantonness]
should be assimilated to [intention]. The conception that the
draft employs is that of extreme indifference to the value of
human life. The significance of [intention] is that, cases of
provocation apart, it demonstrates precisely such indifference.
Whether [wantonness] is so extreme that it demonstrates
similar indifference is not a question that, in our view, can

be further clarified; it must be left directly to the trier of the
facts. If [wantonness] exists but is not so extreme, the homi-

cide is manslaughter. 86

As indicated by this statement, the Legislature in its homicide
provisions has treated an unintentional wrong and an intentional
wrong as legal equivalents. Wantonness has been characterized
in this instance as "equivalent in spirit to actual intent". The
only other instance in the entire Code involving this type of use
for wantonness is in the chapter which defines the bodily injury
offenses.8s

This is the sole use which the criminal law has previously
reserved for the culpable mental state labeled as "wantonness."
It is clear that the General Assembly has provided for a much
broader use of the term. As a consequence, "wantonness" has no
meaningful relationship to its historical predecessor except in the
two situations where the Code equates intentional behavior with
unintentional behavior. Some difficulty with the new mens rea
provision is likely to result from this change in meaning. Experience has demonstrated that a change in words does not always
accomplish a change in understanding. Judicial officers, whether
acting as judges or as advocates, are human, and "the human
mind, except when guided by extraordinary genius, cannot sur86 MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2, Comment 2 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
87 In this chapter, sanctions are provided for bodily injuries which are caused

intentionally. KYPC § 66(1) (a); [KRS § 484A.2-010(1) (a)]. Lesser sanctions
are provided when such injuries are caused wantonly. KYPC § 67 [KRS § 434A.2020]. But when an offender acts wantonly and under circumstances which manifest
extreme indifference to human life, the Code equates his conduct with that of the
intentional offender. KYPC § 66(1') (c); [KBS § 434A.2-010(1) (b)].
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mount the established conclusions amid which it has been
8

reared."1

Third: Recklessness, as defined in the Code, is used in an
unconventional and unusual manner. The aspect of this mental
state that distinguishes it from wantonness is the requirement
that the actor fails to perceive the unjustifiable risk of social harm
that is contained in his conduct. In other words, as described by
the Legislature, recklessness is inadvertent behavior-a kind of
negligence. Though the word recklessly has not always been
consistently defined, it has rarely if ever been used to imply
inadvertence. This has been most clearly established by Professor

Hall:
It is apparent .. .that the relationship of recklessness to

intent and especially its common link with negligence are the
chief area of the prevalent confusion. The major fallacy results from concentration on one or the other of its essential
attributes, usually its objective aspect-thus the common
assertions that it is a sort of negligence and also that it is more
than negligence, that it is gross negligence, and the like.
Actually recklessness isno more a degree of negligence than
is intent. Awareness of increasingthe danger separatesit completely from the genus of negligence. As seen above, it would
be far more defensible to assert that recklessness is a lesser
degree of intent; but that, too, is imprecise. 9
As indicated by this statement, the Kentucky General Assembly

has clearly provided an atypical definition of recklessness. Without the requirement of awareness of danger the new description
is inconsistent with the ordinary usage of this concept.

More significantly it is inconsistent with the definition of this
mental state as contained in modern codes which have come into
existence in recent years. Because of the impact of the Model
Penal Code, none of the recently enacted codes," and none of
those presently under consideration,9 ' has used recklessness as the
88 W. CHURCH-ILL, Tm GATHERING STORzu 476 (1948).
SO J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCPLES OF CRIhUNAL LAW 232 (1947).
00 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAiW § 15.05 (McKinney 1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.

4, § 6-7 (Smith-Hurd 1972).

0'See, e.g., NAT'L COMM'N ON tEFORm OF FED. Cmi. LAws, PROPOSED
F IDEAL CnxvNAL CODE § 302 (1970); GovERNOrt's Covnv. FOR REVISION OF THE
CnmINmuL LAw, PROPOSED DEL. CRnMUNAL CODE § 100 (1967); Omo LEG. SERVICE
COMM'N, PROPOSED 01o CRIMNmAL CODE

§ 2901.22 (1971).
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culpable mental state for inadvertent conduct. Its current use
has been described as follows:
Between the extremes of intentionally and negligence lies
recklessness. Recklessness is like the former in that the actor
is conscious of a forbidden harm, he realizes that his conduct
increases the risk of its occurrence, and he has decided to
create that risk. It is thus a form of intentional harm-doing
in that it, too, is volitional in a wrong direction. But, as noted,
recklessness differs from intention in that the actor does not
seek to attain the harm; he has not chosen it, has not decided
or resolved that it shall occur. Instead, he believes that the
harm will not occur or, in an aggravated form of recklessness,
he is indifferent whether it does or does not occur. That he
deliberately increased the risk does not alter the essential fact
that he did not intend to produce the harm. On the other
hand, it will be recalled, recklessness resembles negligence in
that both include an unreasonable increase in the risk of harm;
both fall below the standard of "due care". 92
The change of labels suggested in this writing would do more
than make the Kentucky law consistent with this statement. It
would serve to eliminate a potential source of difficulty. And,
more importantly, it would provide uniformity in the law of this
jurisdiction and the developing law of other jurisdictions.

Fourth: The use of criminalnegligence as a basis for imposing
criminal sanctions has a much stronger theoretical basis than
was realized by the Legislature when it rejected the original
mens rea provision. As indicated in an earlier part of this discussion, the General Assembly was motivated to alter the culpable
mental states presented in the original legislative proposal by a
concern over the use of negligence to impose penal liability.
Because of the magnitude of the legislation under consideration,
it is highly unlikely that the legislative body, either individually
or collectively, gave thoughtful attention to the rationale for this
small part of the proposal. The justification for this mental state
was excellently presented by the drafters of the Model Code:
Of the four kinds of culpability defined, there is, of course,
least to be said for treating negligence as a sufficient basis for
imposing criminal liability. Since the actor is inadvertent by
92J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRnINAL LA.W 115 (2d. ed. 1960).

1973]

PENAL CODE-CULPABLE MENTAL STATES

hypothesis, it has been argued that the "threat of punishment
for negligence must pass him by, because he does not realize
that it is addressed to him... So too it has been urged that

education or corrective treatment not punishment is the
proper social method for dealing with persons with inadequate
awareness, since what is implied is not a moral defect . . .
We think, however, that this is to over-simplify the issue.
Knowledge that conviction and sentence, not to speak of punishment, may follow conduct that inadvertently creates improper risk supplies men with an additional motive to take
care before acting, to use their faculties and draw on their
experience in gauging the potentialities of contemplated conduct. To some extent, at least, this motive may promote
awareness and thus be effective as a measure of control. Certainly legislators act on this assumption in a host of situations
and it seems to us dogmatic to assert that they are wholly
wrong. Accordingly, we think that negligence, as here defined, cannot be wholly rejected as a ground of culpability
which may suffice for purposes of penal law, though we agree
that it should not be generally deemed sufficient in the definition of specific crimes, and that it often will be right to differentiate such conduct for the purpose of sentence.9 3
It is equally improbable that the General Assembly gave adequate
consideration to the Code's limited use of this mental state.
Except for a minor offense or two, 94 the fourth culpable mental
state is used in defining only two Code offenses, the most minor
homicide offense 5 and the most minor bodily injury offense."
As the Legislature through its interim committee structure reviews
this legislation prior to its next general session these two matters
(the limited use of negligence and the justification for its use)
should be kept foremost in mind.
One final point should be emphasized. Without question the
reason behind the rejection of the original mens rea proposal was
a concern over the imposition of punishment for inadvertent
behavior. In reacting to this concern the Legislature did not
properly account for the fact that the battle over criminal sanctions for "ordinary" inadvertent conduct bad been waged and
3

01 MODEL PENAl, CODE §
04 See, e.g., KYPC § 112

2.02, Comment 3 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).

[KRS § 434B.2-070].
95 KYPC § 65 [KRS § 434A.1-050].
96 KYPC § 68 [KRS § 434A.2-030].
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settled several years earlier in the case of Mayre v. Commonwealth. The issue resolved in that case was not resurrected in
the original legislative proposal. As defined in the original bill,
the mental state labeled as "criminal negligence" required substantially greater degree of culpability than ordinary civil negligence. It could not have been established as an element of crime
without proof of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm as
well as a gross deviation from the standard of ordinary conduct.
A clear understanding of these requirements could serve to further
minimize the objection to the original proposal which existed.
If it can be reduced enough to persuade the legislature to accept
the four culpable mental states originally presented, a potential
problem of considerable magnitude can be eliminated before the
new legislation becomes effective.
D. Transferred Intent
A discussion of the Code's treatment of mens rea is not complete without at least some mention of the concept of transferred
intent. As previously used, this concept had application in three
situations. The first involved this set of circumstances: An offender, by his criminal act, intended to inflict harm on a particular
person and failed to accomplish that objective, but inflicted the
same kind of harm on a different personY7 In the assessment of
criminal liability for this unintended consequence, the actor's
intention to cause harm to his anticipated victim was deemed
sufficient to hold him responsible for the harm actually resulting
to his unanticipated victim. To justify this legal result the law
had conceptualized a transfer of the offender's state of mind."
Though contrary to truth, he was assumed to have intended the
harm which actually resulted. Most jurisdictions have accepted
this use of the concept 9 Kentucky had recognized it in at least
two cases. 009
The remaining two situations in which transferred intent was
used to supply the mental element for an offense were contained
97 See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOx ON CRIMINAL LAW 198 (1972).
98 See J. HALL, GENERAL PIcIPLEs OF CRIMINAL LAW 145 (2d ed. 1960).

99 See, e.g., Mayweather v. State, 242 P. 864 (Ariz. 1926); State v. Gardner,
203 A.2d 77 (Del. 1964); Coston v. State, 198 So. 467 (Fla. 1940); Durham v.
State,0 171
S.E. 265 (Ga. 1933).
1 0 See Shelton v. Commonwealth, 140 S.W. 670 (Ky. 1911); Burchett v.
Commonwealth, 1 S.W. 423 (Ky. 1886).
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in the law of homicide. One of the two involved an offense
known as "misdemeanor-manslaughter"; 1 1 the other involved the
more familiar offense of "felony-murder." 102 As in the one described in the preceding paragraph, in both of these situations
the concept was used to impose liability upon an offender for
unintentional consequences. The first, misdemeanor-manslaughter, provided sanctions for an unintended death which resulted
from the commission of an unlawful act not constituting a felony
and not of a nature to endanger life. In holding an actor of this
type responsible for a resulting death the law supplied the mental
element for the offense by transferring the culpability in the
unlawful act over to the homicide. During one period of the past
the offense of misdemeanor-manslaughter was clearly recognized
as a part of the Kentucky law of homicide. 10 3 This appears to have
changed, however, when the state created its first statutory offense
of involuntary manslaughter. Though the offense (misdemeanormanslaughter) was never expressly repudiated by the Court of
Appeals it was not used as a basis for liability after the creation
of the statutory offense.
The method by which the mental element was supplied in the
third situation (the felony-murder offense) is identical to that
used for misdemeanor-manslaughter. When an unintentional
death occurred in the commission of a felony offense, the intention
to commit the underlying felony was transferred to the homicide
to supply the mental element necessary for a conviction of murder.
It was in this situation that the Kentucky Court of Appeals so
clearly stated the concept of transferred intent:
Although the accused may not have bad the intention of
taking a life, malice in respect to such homicide may be implied or inferred on the ground that the killing was done while
the person who did the act was engaged in the commission of
some other felony or in an attempt to perpetrate some offense
of that grade. "The turpitude of the act contemplated is by
implication of law transferred to the homicide which actually
101 See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTt, supra note 97, at 594; R. PEBKIs, supra note
47, at 73.
102 See W. LAFAVE &A. ScoTT, supra note 97, at 545; R. PEWMKns, supra note
47, at 37.
103 E.g., Middleton v. Commonwealth, 202 S.W.2d 610 (Ky. 1947); Sikes v.
Commonwealth, 200 S.W.2d 956 (Ky. 1947); Lewis v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.2d
416 (Ky. 1946); Lowe v. Commonwealth, 181 S.W.2d 409 (Ky. 1944).
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is committed so as to make the latter offense a killing with
malice, contrary to the real fact of the case as it appears in
04
evidence."
The unsoundness of the concept of transferred intent is precisely indicated in this statement. The culpability of harm-causing
conduct is assumed to exist even though the assumption may be
"contrary to the real fact of the case." Stated somewhat differently, the concept prevents decision makers from accurately assessing the moral blameworthiness of an offender's conduct. To
assure that this type of assessment occurs the Code has eliminated
the notion altogether. This does not mean, however, that sanctions for the type of conduct described above have been abolished.
The Code has simply provided a more rational basis for judging
an offender's culpability when unintentional consequences flow
from intentional conduct.
In the situation first described above, i.e., where the actual
consequences and the intended consequences differ only to the
extent that a different victim than the one intended is harmed,
the Code attributes no significance to the difference. An offender's
culpability is measured by the harm which he intended to bring
about.'0 5 The treatment accorded the second and third situations
can best be described by reference to the following comment by
the drafters of the original bill:
Felony murder, as a separate category of homicide, has
been used in Kentucky to impose criminal liability. This
offense has typically been used to convict a defendant who
accidentally kills another while committing a dangerous
felony or who participates in the commission of a felony which
results in an intentional act of killing by a participant other
than the defendant. ...
[The Code] does not preclude the type of conduct described above as constituting murder. It does, however, abandon the doctrine of felony murder as an independent basis for
establishing an offense of homicide .... [D]eaths occurring in

the course of other felonies must be judged under the "intentional" and ["wantonness with extreme indifference" pro104 Tarrence v. Commonwealth, 265 S.W.2d 40, 50-51 (Ky. 1954).

15 KYPC § 17(2) (a) [KRS § 433B.1-060 (2) (a)].
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visions of the murder statute and the "wantonness" provision
of the manslaughter statute] .'0

This means that an intent to commit an unlawful act, whether it
be felony or misdemeanor, will not be transferred in any fashion
for the purpose of imposing sanctions for a resulting homicide.
Criminal liability for death caused by such an act will be assessed only if the actor's state of mind, considering all of the
circumstances which surrounded his conduct, constitutes one of
the culpable mental states established by the Code as the mental
element for a homicide offense.
II.

THE

CULPABLE MENTAL STATES: RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER

GENERAL PRINCIPLES
In reviewing the new Code it is noticeable that the doctrine
of mens rea is not confined in its involvement to a mere description
of mental states which are deemed to be morally blameworthy.
It plays a part in the Code's treatment of several other matters.
In some instances its role has not changed in form or substance
with the new legislation. The manner in which the defense of
intoxication is treated offers an example. Under prior law voluntary intoxication could not be presented as an excuse for criminal
behavior; however, it could serve to negate a mental element
that was essential to the commission of an offense. 07 In the Code
the General Assembly has provided that intoxication is a defense
to a criminal charge if it "negatives the existence of an element of
the offense." 10 The same type of codification has occurred with
respect to ignorance or mistake of law. Previously the commission
of an offense could not be excused because of such ignorance or
mistake. 10 9 To this broadly stated principle, however, there was
an exception. If an essential element of mens rea was negated by
an offender's ignorance or mistake, liability could not be assessed." 0
Both the principle and the exception are contained in the new
statute. Relief from liability is not possible unless "ignorance or
100 LRC § 810, Commentary.
107 Mearns v. Commonwealth, 175 S.W. 355 (Ky. 1915).

See also Abbott v.
Commonwealth, 205 S.W.2d 348 (Ky. 1947) (dictum); Blackburn v. Commonwealth, 255 S.W. 99 (Ky. 1923) (dictum).
108 KYPC § 19 [KRS § 433B.1-080].
1o Jellico Coal Mining Co. v. Commonwealth, 29 S.W. 26 (Ky. 1895).
110 Rand v. Commonwealth, 195 S.W. 802 (Ky. 1917).
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mistake negatives the existence of the culpable mental state required for commission of an offense.""'
With respect to several other matters of general application
the doctrine of mens rea has taken on a new or different role in
the Code. Perhaps the most significant one is in the area of
criminal causation. Two others are important enough, however,
to merit brief consideration-one in the area of justification, the
other in the area of complicity liability. The principal objective
of this part of the article is to provide a description of the changes
made by the new legislation in these three areas.
A. Criminal Causation
As noted in Part I, one type of criminal offense is defined so as
to proscribe a result of conduct rather than the conduct itself.
Homicide and assault-with death and bodily injury as the proscribed results-are the best examples. In most cases involving
this type of offense "causation" does not become a significant issue.
When an offender fires a gun which projects a missile into the
body of another and causes death shortly thereafter the essential
causal connection between the result and the conduct can be
established without difficulty. But in a significant number of
cases the question is not free of difficulty. Occasionally, factors
which operate independently of physical forces generated by a
defendant's conduct influence a harmful result and give rise to a
claim by that defendant that his conduct did not legally cause the
result. For such occasions there must exist a standard by which to
measure an actor's responsibility. In satisfaction of this need the
law has declared, almost from the beginning, that an offender
cannot be held responsible for a given result unless his conduct
was its proximate cause." 2
Despite the fact that proximate cause has been used prominently in both civil and criminal law for centuries, one can say in
description of the concept only that it is a cause which will be
given juridical effect. Its opposite, a remote cause, is one which
will not be given such effect. In this jurisdiction and most others
the principles which have been developed in the law's effort to
111 KYPC § 18 [KRS § 433B.1-0701.
112 See W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CmMINAL LAW 246 (1972);
R. PERK Ns, CumiN. LA-w 690 (1969).
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categorize causes as either proximate or remote have become
almost totally immersed in confusion. Nevertheless, a discussion
of these principles and the problems toward which they were
directed is essential to an appropriate consideration of the Code's
causation provision. The most important of these principles have
developed in response to the following questions: (i) what is
the effect on liability of a pre-existing weakness which caused a
criminal act to have greater harmful consequences than it would
ordinarily have had; (ii) is the responsibility of an offender for
a criminal result affected by the existence of a contributing cause
which emanates from an independent source; and, (iii) what is
the impact on a defendant's liability of a second cause which
intervenes between his conduct and the result and becomes a
more immediate cause? Each of these questions has been the
subject of substantial consideration by the Kentucky Court of
Appeals as it has struggled with the doctrine of criminal causation.
1. Contributing Causes
Few principles in the area of criminal causation have received
universal approval. There is perhaps only one. All jurisdictions
have ruled that an offender's conduct cannot be the "legal" cause
of a result unless it is first an "actual" cause."' And, though the
wording may differ slightly from one jurisdiction to another actual
cause is typically defined as an antecedent without which the
result in question would not have occurred." 4 With this definition
it is nearly impossible to imagine the existence of a proscribed
result which has only a single cause. In most every instance
involving a socially harmful result an infinite number of antecedents will have joined to bring it about. The death of a homicide victim, for example, is caused by a shot fired from the gun
of an offender. But, as actual causation has been defined, it is also
caused by the individual who innocently invited the victim to the
place where the killing occurred, by the one who innocently
transported him there, and even by the parents who brought
about his birth. But for the conduct of each the result in question
would not have occurred. Therefore, each is a contributing cause
of the result.
3

3 See W. LAFAvL & A. ScoTT, supra note 112, at 249; R. PmuaNs, supra

note 112, at 687.
114 See J.HALL,

GENERAL
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251 (2d ed. 1960).
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The manner in which the law generally deals with contributing
causes is indicated by the case of Bennett v. Commonwealth.11n

As the climax to a violent affray, the defendant and his brother
(who was never apprehended), each acting independently, shot at
one of the participants. On the basis of proof which established
that both actors were successful, the defendant asserted that his
shot was not the one which caused death. A jury rejected this

assertion and found the defendant responsible for the homicide.
In the instructions the trial court stated to the jury that an offender
can be held responsible even though his act merely contributes to
a result. The defendant challenged the validity of this instruction
in his appeal. In affirming the conviction the Court of Appeals
stated the guiding principle in such cases:
The law will not stop, in such a case, to measure which
wound is the more serious, and to speculate upon which
actually caused the death. In many such cases the commonwealth would be helpless; for each defendant would go
free because it could not be proven against him that his wound
was the fatal one. Whether one actually inflicts the fatal
wound, or contributes to or hastens the death in some minor
way, he is guilty of the crime .... 116
With this decision the Court simply recognized the reality mentioned in the preceding paragraph, namely, that every proscribed
result can be traced to an infinite number of actual causes. Its
115 150 S.W. 806 (Ky. 1912).
116 Id. at 808. This quotation contains an implication that in situations like
that which existed in Bennett v. Commonwealth the law is not concerned with the
actual cause of a harmful result. In a subsequent case involving similar circumstances this notion had a more significant impact. The defendant was shown to
have struck his victim about the head with a club with sufficient force to inflict
a mortal wound. Evidence was introduced by the defendant, however, to show
that before the victim died from this wound another person inflicted an independent mortal wound which actually caused death. In affirming a murder conviction of the defendant, the Court of Appeals explained its decision in this way:
If one willfully and with malice aforethought mortally wounds
another with a deadly weapon, the fact another immediately thereafter
unlawfully, willfully, and maliciously inflicts a distinct wound, whether of
itself mortal or not, on the wounded person, and thereby accelerates or
hastens his death, both are guilty of murder. Payne v. Commonwealth,
75 S.W.2d 14, 19 (Ky. 1934).
This analysis is clearly erroneous, for it judges the first offender not by what his
conduct actually caused but rather by what it might have caused absent the superseding cause. Or, as stated rhetorically by Professor Hall, "since mortals die but
once and inasmuch as the second offender is guilty of the criminal homicide, how
can the first offender also be held for the criminal homicide?" J. HALL, supra note
114, at 265.
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ruling that an antecedent can be a legally-recognized cause
though not a sole cause dispenses with nearly all causation issues
involving contributing or concurrent causes. In only one situation
has the presence of a contributing cause been significant to the
development of a doctrine of criminal causation. 1 It can best be
introduced by use of Hopkins v. Commonwealth.1 7

In Hopkins the victim suffered a gunshot wound at the hands
of the defendant. At the time of the shooting the victim was in
"a very feeble condition of health .

.

. and would probably not

have lived very long even if he had not been wounded."" 8 More
significantly, it was conceded that had his health been good he
would have survived the offender's act. As it was he lived only
two months. For this death the defendant was convicted of
murder. On appeal the Court of Appeals ruled that the defendant
was properly held responsible for the ultimate consequence of his
act. With its ruling the Court simply stated that "if one unlawfully wounds another, and thereby hastens or accelerates his
death by reason of some disease with which he is afflicted, the
wrongdoer is guilty of the crime thereby resulting."" '
2
In the second"'

and third'2 1 cases presenting this problem

the Court of Appeals was more descriptive in its analysis. The
second involved a death which resulted in part from a gunshot
wound. In defending a homicide charge the defendant introduced
proof to show that his shot activated a dormant goiter with which
the victim was afflicted and that the poison from this goiter was
the direct cause of death. In the third case evidence indicated
that the defendant had inflicted a blow to the head of his victim.
Death resulted two days later as a direct consequence of a
cerebral hemorrhage. An identical argument was presented on
appeal by each of these defendants-that the proscribed result
was not caused by his conduct. And in each instance the Court
of Appeals rejected the argument, explaining its decision with
this language:
One is criminally liable where he inflicts wounds that
cause the death of the victim indirectly or through a chain of
.17 80

S.W. 156 (Ky. 1904).

1J8 Id. at 156.

19 Id.
'2 0 Tincher v. Commonwealth, 69 S.W.2d 750 (Ky. 1934).
121 Flynn v. Commonwealth, 302 S.W.2d 851 (Ky. 1957).
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natural effects and cause, unchanged by human action, or
where violence inflicted by the accused was a clear contrib122
uting cause of death although perhaps not the sole cause.
In each of these three cases, it is very clear that the offender's
conduct was in fact an actual cause of death. It is equally clear
that the "contributing" cause (i.e., the pre-existing condition)
was no more predominant in bringing about the result than the
act of the defendant. Under these circumstances the Court of
Appeals experienced no difficulty in finding proximate causation.
With a slight change in circumstances, however, substantial
difficulty in dealing with this issue surfaced. The first significant
case was Hubbard v. Commonwealth.123 Arrested for public
drunkenness and taken before a court, the defendant was too
intoxicated to stand trial. The judge ordered that he be taken
to jail. Defendant resisted this order and engaged in a violent
scuffle with police officials. During this scuffle one of the participants suffered heart failure without having received any physical force against his person from the defendant. Notwithstanding this fact, the defendant was convicted of manslaughter. On
appeal the conviction was reversed on the ground that the defendant's conduct was not deemed sufficiently proximate to the
result to support liability. The Court of Appeals explained its
decision in this way:
It seems to us that where the cause of death was not due
to a corporal blow or injury (essential under the early common
law) or to some hostile demonstration or overt act directed
toward the person of the decedent, there is no criminal
liability unless death or serious bodily harm was the probable
and natural consequence of an indirect, unlawful act of the
accused. If there is reasonable doubt of this it would be
unjust to punish the accused. 124
The only other reported case 125 having this change in circumstances was almost identical to the preceding case. The defendant unlawfully entered another's house at night in a drunken
state and created a disturbance. He was ordered to leave and
Id. at 852.
123 202 S.W.2d 634 (Ky. 1947).
124 Id. at 636.
125 Graves v. Commonwealth, 273 S.W.2d 380 (Ky. 1954).
122
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complied. Shortly thereafter he was back, again demanding admittance, pounding on the front door and rapping on a bedroom
window. As a consequence of the excitement generated by this
conduct an occupant "lapsed into unconsciousness and died three
days later from the effects of a cerebral hemorrhage.' ' 6 Medical
testimony was introduced to show that the hemorrhage was a
direct result of the defendant's conduct. As in the first case the
defendant was convicted of manslaughter. And, once again the
case was reversed on appeal, the Court relying on the principle
established in Hubbard.
These two cases differed from the first group in only one
respect. Death resulted in the absence of physical or corporal
harm to the victim.'27 Despite an effort by the Court of Appeals
to discount its importance 2 8 this factor appears to have been
all-important to the Court's judgment. At the very least it affected
the standard used to decide the causation issue. In those cases
involving a physical injury the Court declared that the result
must have been caused "indirectly or through a chain of natural
effects and cause." In the absence of such an injury the result
in question must have been "the probable and natural consequence" of the offender's conduct. Obviously the difference in
these two standards is not discernible. Nevertheless it is clear
from the opinions that the Court of Appeals intended a difference.
This is confirmed in the most recent decision involving the death
of a victim who had a pre-existing condition which contributed
to a harmful result. 129 In this case the defendant committed an
assault and battery upon an elderly man. Shortly thereafter death
resulted from a coronary occlusion. In affirming a homicide conviction the Court of Appeals quoted the standard of measurement
Id. at 381.
Any difference which might have existed with respect to the mens rea of
the respective offenders would bear only upon the degree of the homicide offense
and should not affect the issue of causation.
128 In Graves v. Commonwealth, 273 S.W.2d 380, 382 (Ky. 1954), the Court
said that "at early common law the view prevailed that responsibility for homicide
did not attach where there was no physical or corporeal injury. The rule has been
relaxed through the years so that now a conviction may be sustained for a death
caused by fright, fear, or terror alone, even though no hostile demonstration or
overt act was directed at the person of the deceased." In another case, Hubbard v.
Commonwealth, 202 S.W.2d 634, 636 (Ky. 1947), the Court was more positive in
this respect: "Under most modem decisions death caused or accomplished through
fright, fear or nervous shock may form a basis for criminal responsibility."
129 Mason v. Commonwealth, 423 S.W.2d 532 (Ky. 1967).
12

127
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previously used in the "physical force" cases and emphasized that
there was "continuity and connection between the violence inflicted and the death."' 30
All of these cases have a common dimension: in each instance
conduct which originated with the defendant served to alter a
pre-existing condition and to bring about a proscribed result. One
other common dimension may be added by assumption: in any
two cases of this type, one involving and one not involving a
corporal blow or injury, the offenders could have identical culpability with reference to the result. They could intend to cause
the result; or they could act recidessly or negligently. If these
common factors are properly considered-comparable conduct,
identical results and identical elements of mens rea-it is not
possible to justify the distinction created by the Court of Appeals
in these cases. On the other hand, by considering the policy
which underlies the doctrine of causation, one can readily appreciate the Court's belief that the absence of a corporal injury
should have some bearing upon causation issues of this type.
Before attempting to describe this policy, and in order to make a
discussion of it more meaningful, it is necessary to change
directions at this point and present a brief description of another
pre-existing causation problem. It involves what is commonly
labeled "intervening" causation.
2. Intervening Causes
Issues of causation have been more troublesome when some
force over which a defendant has no control comes into play
subsequent to his act and becomes a more immediate cause of a
proscribed result. 13 1 Liability under such circumstances is made
to depend in most jurisdictions upon classification of the intervening antecedent as either a dependent or an independent intervening cause. The former may be defined as a cause which is a
consequence of a defendant's conduct,13 2 the latter as one which
Id. at 535.
131 Typical of this situation is the one which existed in the case of Embry v.
Commonwealth, 32 S.W.2d 979 (Ky. 1930). The defendant in this case tossed a
handful of blasting powder into a fireplace and caused an explosion which set a
house on fire. Two occupants were killed as a result of the fire. Charged with
homicide for these deaths, the accused defended himself by asserting that the
victims were negligent in trying to escape the fire and that this negligence was
the cause of their deaths.
132 See W. LAFAvE- & A. ScoTt, supra note 112, at 257.
130
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is a coincidence of conditions created by a defendant. 3' If an
intervening cause is classified as dependent and consists of something other than a human act it does not affect an offender's
liability. Notwithstanding the interposition of a force over which
he had no control he is nevertheless responsible for the harmful
result.:34 On the other hand, if a dependent intervening cause
consists of human action, it may serve as a superseding cause and
relieve a defendant of criminal responsibility. This relief is available only if the intervening human act constitutes an abnormal
response to the defendant's earlier conduct. If classified as a
normal response once again the intervening cause has no impact
upon liability. 135 If an intervening cause is independent-a mere
coincidence of the conditions produced by the defendant-it
serves as a superseding cause and relieves the defendant of
responsibility unless it was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant at the time of his conduct. 6
Only on rare occasions has the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
used the terms described in the preceding paragraph. As a consequence it is somewhat difficult to understand the Court's treatment of intervening causes. Upon careful analysis of the cases
two things seem to stand out: one-the decisions involving intervening causes have been guided by a common objective; and two
-they are bound together, albeit rather loosely, with a common
thread. Nearly all of the cases involving this part of the doctrine
of causation have been influenced to some extent by the decision
37
in Bush v. Commonwealth,1
a case whose fact situation seems
susceptible of existence only in the mind of a fiction writer. In
this case a non-fatal, gunshot wound was inflicted by the defendant upon his victim. While being treated for this wound, and
because of negligence on the part of a treating physician, the
victim contracted scarlet fever. Death resulted as an immediate
consequence of the fever. The defendant was charged with
murder and convicted. In reversing this conviction the Court of
Appeals reasoned as follows:
13

Id.

134 See R. PERKINs, supra note 112, at 257.
135 See W. LAFAVE &A. ScoTT, supra note 112, at 258; R. PERIN~s, supra note

112, at 710.
130 See W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 112, at 258; R. PEaUINs, supra note
112, at 725.
137

78 Ky. 268 (1880).
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When the disease is a consequence of the wound although
the proximate cause of death, the person inflicting the wound
is guilty, because the death can be traced as a result naturally
flowing from the wound and coming in the natural order of
things; but when there is a supervening cause, not naturally
intervening by reason of the wound and not produced by any
necessity created by the wound, the death is by the visitation
of Providence and not from the act of the party inflicting the
wound .... 188
In most jurisdictions the intervening cause in Bush would have
been labeled independent-a coincidence of the conditions created
by the defendant's conduct-and homicide liability made to
depend upon whether the intervening antecedent was reasonably
foreseeable. As indicated by this quotation the Kentucky Court
framed the issue of liability in terms of whether or not death
resulted as a natural consequence of the defendant's conduct.
Following this decision causation issues involving intervening
antecedents almost always focused upon this standard of measurement, though the exact language of Bush was not regularly
repeated. More significantly, as indicated in the discussion which
follows, application of the standard was not made to depend upon
a classification of intervening antecedents as either dependent
or independent.
Two types of cases serve as illustrations. In the first, the intervening antecedent was an immediate result-causing act by a
victim. Sanders v. Commonwealth13 9 is typical. The proof in
this case indicated that the defendant threatened his wife with a
deadly weapon while they were in a moving vehicle. In response
to this threat she jumped from the vehicle and suffered injuries
from which she ultimately died. Notwithstanding a claim that
the victim had caused her own death, the accused was held
responsible for the result. In a strikingly similar case 140 an offender
threatened his wife with bodily injury by use of a knife. To avoid
this threat she left the place where it was tendered, and was
found the next morning badly frozen, dead from exposure to cold
weather. The defendant was convicted of manslaughter for his
138 'd. at 271.
319 50 S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 1932).
0
Hendrickson v. Commonwealth, 3 S.W. 166 (Ky. 1887).
34
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conduct but obtained a reversal on appeal. The Court of Appeals
ruled that the jury should have been instructed that an offender
can be convicted under these circumstances only if death can be
described as "a natural and probable consequence" of his con41
duct.1
In a second group of cases presented to the Court of Appeals
the intervening antecedent consisted of unskillful medical or
surgical treatment. When first presented as a defense to a homicide charge this antecedent was held to be a superseding cause. 42
An offender who created the need for such treatment could not
be held responsible for a resulting death, even though the injury
which he inflicted would have ultimately caused that result. After
the decision in Bush v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals
altered its position with respect to this type of intervening cause."'
Responsibility for a resulting death was made to turn upon the
type of injury inflicted by a defendant. If it was viewed as a
dangerous one-calculated to threaten life-responsibility for a
subsequent death was imposed though its immediate cause was
improper or unskillful treatment. But if the injury was classified
as non-dangerous,improper medical treatment was considered to
be a superseding cause. In none of these cases can one find
express reference to the "natural and probable consequence'
standard. But it obviously had an influence. Using dangerousness
of the injury as the pivotal factor was totally consistent with the
Bush decision. In no way can a death which follows an injury
which does not endanger life be declared a natural and probable
consequence of that injury.
The most important thing reflected in these groups of cases is
the singleness of purpose in the Court's approach to this type of
causation problem. The interposition of an intervening antecedent always creates a variation between the actual consequences
of an offender's conduct and those which he intended or contemplated. When presented with this problem, though the manner in which the issue was framed differed from time to time, it
is clear that the Court struggled in each instance to determine
Id. at J68.
Coffman v. Commonwealth, 73 Ky. 495 (1874).
143 King v. Commonwealth, 148 S.W.2d 1044 (Ky. 1941); Tibbs v. Commonwealth, 128 S.W. 871 (Ky. 1910).
141
142
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whether the variation was so great that the imposition of liability
for the result would not blend with fundamental notions of fairness. More often than not the issue was framed in terms of
whether the result-nearly always a death-"was the natural and
probable consequence of the unlawful act complained of.' 4 4

8. CausationUnder the Code
One of the most prominent objectives of the criminal law is
the identification of dangerous individuals. Another of its objectives, equal in importance, is the creation of an equitable system
of sanctions. Equal offenders should be entitled under the law
to equal treatment. In seeking to accomplish these objectives
the law could easily justify identical sanctions for every individual
who engages in conduct intending some particular social harm.
with no importance attributed to the success or failure of his effort.
In other words, no distinction would be made between an offender
who attempts an offense and one who commits that same offense.
Relating this thought to the law of homicide, this approach would
simply recognize that an individual who directs force toward
another person with intention to cause his death manifests in his
conduct no greater dangerousness with a successful effort than
with an unsuccessful one. Notwithstanding the unquestionable
validity of this conclusion the criminal law has never been satisfied
with identical treatment of successful and unsuccessful offenders.
Because of what are conceived to be acceptable notions of justice
and fairness, the murderer and the attempted murderer suffer
significantly different treatment.
From the very beginning the doctrine of causation has developed as the end product of the law's struggle to reconcile this
basic conflict, the thrust and counterthrust of criminal law objectives and notions of fundamental fairness. The drafters of the
Model Penal Code described the struggle as follows:
When concepts of "proximate causation" disassociate the
actor's conduct and a result of which it was a but-for cause,
the reason always inheres in the judgement that the actor's
culpability with reference to the result, i.e., his purpose,
knowledge, recklessness or negligence, was such that it would
144 Commonwealth v. Couch, 106 S.W. 830, 831 (Ky. 1908).
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be unjust to permit the result to influence his liability
or the
1 45
gravity of the offense of which he is convicted.
As indicated by this statement, in every case involving a causation
issue the defendant's conduct has been the but-for cause of a
proscribed result. The result, however, has occurred in a manner
that is different from that which was intended (if the mental state
was intention) or threatened (if the mental state was recklessness
or criminal negligence). The function of those principles which
comprise the doctrine of causation is to provide a means by which
the law can choose in this situation whether it will treat the
offender as it treats a successful offender or as it treats an unsuccessful one.
After eliminating those parts which are not relevant to the
present discussion the means provided for making this choice
under the new Code are contained in this provision:
(1) Conduct is the cause of a result when it is an antecedent without which the result in question would not have
occurred.
(2) When intentionally causing a particular result is an
element of an offense, the element is not established if the
actual result is not within the intention or the contemplation
of the actor unless:
(b) The actual result involves the same kind of injury
or harm as that intended or contemplated and occurs in
a manner which the actor knows or should know is
rendered substantially more probable by his conduct.
(3) When wantonly or recklessly causing a particular
result is an element of an offense, the element is not established if the actual result is not within the risk of which the
actor is aware or in the case of recklessness of which he
should be aware unless:
(b) The actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as the probable result and occurs in a manner which the actor knows or should know is rendered
substantially more probable by his conduct.
(4) The question of whether an actor knew or should have
145 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03, Comment 2 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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known the result he caused was rendered substantially more
14
probable by his conduct is an issue of fact.
The first subsection of this provision merely codifies the rule
that conduct cannot be the legally-recognized cause of a result
unless it is first the actual cause of that result. No change in
previous doctrine is accomplished by this principle. Revision of
this part of the law is left for the other three subsections.
The resolution of causation problems under this provision
may best be illustrated by use of a typical causation issue. The
circumstances of Commonwealth v. Kilburn'4 7 offer an ideal example. The defendant in this case, during the course of a mutual
affray, inflicted an injury upon his antagonist by use of a knife.
Ordinarily the injury would not have been fatal. But several
weeks later tetanus ensued from the wound and the victim died
as a consequence. Though framed in terms of causation the real
issue presented by these circumstances is whether to assess liability against the defendant for a bodily injury offense or for a homicide. Under the new Code consideration of this issue must commence with an evaluation of the actor's state of mind; and, with
respect to this element, there are several possibilities. The offender
may have intended with his conduct to bring about the death of
his victim. If so, it is certain that he would not have intended
death to occur in the manner in which it occurred. He would
have intended that it result directly from his conduct and not in
combination with a subsequently acquired disease. On the other
hand the offender may have acted with a culpable mental state
other than intentionally. For example, absent a conscious desire
to cause death, the defendant in Kilburn could have been aware
that his conduct was accompanied by a great risk of death to his
victim. His awareness, however, would have been restricted to
death resulting as a direct consequence of his use of the deadly
weapon and not in combination with an unexpected disease. In
both of these situations-that involving the intentional actor as
well as that involving the unintentional one-the Code recognizes
that the variation between the intended or probable result and
the actual result, though it involves only the manner in which
the result occurs, might be such that it ought to have a significant
146
147

KYPC § 17 [KRS § 433B.1-060].
34 S.W.2d 728 (Ky. 1931).
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bearing upon an actor's liability. Whether or not the variation
is sufficiently great in degree to warrant this effect is the crux
of the causation problem. The Code requires that in every in-

stance this issue be framed in terms of whether or not the actual
result was foreseen or foreseeable by the actor as a reasonable
148
probability.
In what specific ways does this provision improve upon preexisting law? In its effort to deal with complex problems of
causation the Court of Appeals of Kentucky did not catalogue its
issues in terms of concurrent and intervening causes, dependent
and independent causes, normal and abnormal responses, etc.
Much to its credit the Court took a more direct approach to the
problems. As a result, some of the difficulty experienced by other
jurisdictions was avoided. Nevertheless a fundamental weakness
prevailed. In any given case it was not possible to predict with
any degree of certainty the exact manner in which the causation
148 This standard of measurement originated in the Model Penal Code. In its
tentative draft of this document the American Law Institute proposed two provisions as alternative solutions to the causation problem. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.03 (Tent. Draft No. 4 1955). One of the two was the provision adopted by
the General Assembly and described above. The other, ultimately adopted as a
part of the official draft of the Model Code, was identical except for the final
criterion by which causation issues are to be resolved. It required that liability
for a proscribed result turn upon whether the actual result of conduct was "too
accidental in its occurrence to have a just bearing on the actor's liability or on
the gravity of his offense." Id. Actually, this formulation of the standard of
measurement might have added greater clarity to the law than the one adopted
by the General Assembly. As indicated in the text the law's need for a doctrine
of causation gravitates from notions of justice and fairness. In view of the
infinite variety of circumstances under which causation issues are presented, what
better way to resolve the problem than to ask whether the proscribed result was
too remote or accidental in its occurrence to influence the offender's criminality?
Whatever the relative merits of the alternative provisions might be it is very clear
that their creators contemplated that both would function identically and both
would function well. They expressed themselves in these words.
Viewed in these terms, it may be said that either the proposed or the
alternative formulation should suffice for the exclusion of those situations
where the actual result is so remote from the actor's purpose or contemplation that juries can be expected to believe that it should have no bearing on
the actor's liability for the graver offense, or, stated differently, on the
gravity of the offense of which he is convicted. If, for example, the
defendant attempted to shoot his wife and missed, with the result that
she retired to her parent's country home and then was killed in falling
off a horse, no one would think that the defendant should be held guilty
of murder, though he did intend her death and his attempt to kill her
was a but-for cause of her encounter with the horse. Both court and
jury would regard the actual result as "too accidental in its occurrence
to have a just bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of his
offense." Alternatively, they would regard the actual result as one which
did not occur in a manner that the actor knew or should have known
was rendered substantially more probable by his conduct when he attempted to shoot his wife to death. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03, Comment
4 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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issue would be framed. This weakness is traceable to a failure
of the Court of Appeals to declare clearly, and for its own benefit,
the policy behind the doctrine of causation. The Code eradicates
this weakness by providing a single standard of measurement for
all causation issues. In this way the attention and focus of
decision-makers is diverted from such factors as the existence or
non-existence of corporal injury, the degree of dangerousness of
an injury, the existence of pre-existing conditions, contributing
causes, and intervening causes, and directed to a single criterion
by which a particular causation problem should be resolved.
Finally, and perhaps of more significance than any other factor,
the new provision offers "a principle that will permit both courts
and juries to begin afresh in facing problems of this kind."'49
B. Justification
In the area of justification the doctrine of mens rea has taken
on an important new role. It can best be described in relationship
to the most understood type of justification-the use of force in
self-protection. As the privilege of self-defense has been universally described, its availability is dependent upon a showing
(i) that the defendant believed himself in need of protection
against an unlawful attack and (ii) that he believed the force
used to repel the aggression was not excessive. 50 In the application of this privilege to particular cases the law has consistently
refused to recognize a right in the user of physical force to be sole
judge of the peril which he confronted and the degree of force
needed to avoid that peril. Instead it has required that availability of the privilege be restricted to those defendants whose
essential beliefs are based upon reasonable grounds, an obviously
objective standard.' 51 As a consequence of this requirement, as
stated in one opinion, "one's right to resist force with force is
dependent upon what a reasonably cautious and prudent man
would have done under the conditions then existing." 15 2
This notion has been incorporated into the law of justification
of this state, as that law exists prior to the effective date of the
149 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03, Comment 4 (Tent.
35o See W. LAFAVE & A. Sco-rr, supra note 112,

Draft No. 4, 1955).
at 391; R. PERKINs, supra

note 112, at 886.
151 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04, Comment 14 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
152 State v. Rummelhoff, 459 P.2d 976, 977 (Wash. App. 1969).
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Code. A defendant can avail himself of the privilege of selfdefense only by showing that he believed himself to be in imminent danger from another's use of unlawful force, that he
believed the force used to repel the aggression no more than
necessary for self-protection, and, most significantly, that there
were reasonable grounds for each of these beliefs.153 Reflected
in this last requirement is an unwillingness in the law to have an
individual's criminal responsibility measured by the moral blameworthiness indicated by his state of mind. In this state, and most
others as well, this unwillingness is not restricted in application
to the privilege of self-defense. The requirement of reasonableness of belief is a part of the privilege to use force in protection
of property, 5 4 the privilege to use force in law enforcement, 155
and presumably all other privileges which are broadly categorized
as justification.
Through this requirement the law has created an undesirable
legal result. The privilege of self-defense once again offers the
best illustration. If a defendant kills another person without any
semblance of excuse or justification he is guilty of the offense of
murder. If another defendant kills intentionally while entertaining an unreasonable though honest belief in personal danger,
under the law described in the preceding paragraph he too is
guilty of murder. The sanctions which may be imposed upon the
latter are not distinguishable from those which may be imposed
upon the former. Yet the moral blameworthiness of the two
offenders is vastly different. In recognition of this difference some
jurisdictions have created a special type of privilege, commonly
labeled as an "imperfect self-defense." 5 It is available to a defendant who can establish the beliefs necessary to support a
defense of self protection but cannot establish reasonable grounds
for those beliefs. And, when available, the privilege serves only
to reduce the offense from murder to a lower degree of homicide.
Except on rare occasion, 57 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
3S3 E.g., Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 S.W.2d 1018 (Ky. 1948); Farley v.
Commonwealth, 145 S.W.2d 100 (Ky. 1940); Ferguson v. Commonwealth, 34
S.W.2d 959 (Ky. 1931).
154
5 5 E.g., Carroll v. Commonwealth 299 S.W. 183 (Ky. 1927).

1 E.g., Crawford v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W.2d 286 (Ky. 1931).
156 See W. LAFAvE & A. Scor, supra note 112, at 583.
157 The clearest statement of the imperfect self-defense in a Kentucky case

was the following:

(Continued on next page)
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has not recognized this special privilege. Absent reasonable
grounds for his beliefs, a defendant is denied the defense of selfprotection and convicted of intentional murder, if death resulted
from this act, or intentional battery, if only bodily injury resulted.
In the Code the problem that is reflected in this discussion
is viewed as one involving the doctrine of mens rea. The major
consequence is a fundamental change in the description of those
circumstances under which an individual is justified in using physical force. No longer are the privileges qualified by a requirement
that a defendant's belief in the need for his use of force be based
upon reasonable grounds. 158 If a defendant acts under a belief
honestly held that his life is in danger, the privilege of selfprotection is available to justify his conduct though his belief is
not reasonably based.1 59 To say that the privilege is available to
this type of defendant, however, is not to say that he is completely exonerated from criminal sanctions. He is free of liability
for offenses which have intention as the culpable mental state
(i.e., murder if death resulted from his act or intentional assault
if only bodily injury resulted). He is not free of liability for
offenses which have wantonness or recklessness as the essential
mental element, provided the unreasonableness of his beliefs is
sufficiently blameworthy to satisfy the Code definitions of "wantonly" or "recklessly." 60 The practical impact of this change in
the definition of justification has been described as follows:
As a consequence of subsection (1) of this section, however, a defense of justification that is based upon an unreasonable belief may be limited in application to offenses having
"intentional" as the essential element of culpability. If the
belief upon which a defendant's use of force is based is so
unreasonable as to constitute ["wantoness" or "recldessness"],
justification is not available for offenses having either of these
culpable mental states as the essential element of culpability.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

The court should have instructed that the jury might find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter upon the idea that he had used
more force than was necessary or reasonably necessary to protect his
property. Commonwealth v. Beverly, 34 S.W.2d 941, 944 (Ky. 1931).
15s KYPC § 31 and 83-87 [KRS §§ 433C.1-050 and 433C.1-070 to 433C.1-

1101.

159 KYPC § 31; [KRS § 433C.1-050].
160 KYPC § 38 [KRS § 433C.1-120].

1973]

PENAL. CODE-CULPABLE METAL STATES

For example, if a defendant, in killing another, believes himself in danger of death but is [wanton] in having such a belief,
he cannot be convicted of murder. But since manslaughter
in the second degree is committed through ["wantonness"]
and since this subsection denies a defendant justification for
such an offense, he can be convicted of this lesser degree of
homicide.' 10

When an individual applies physical force against another under
an unreasonable belief as to its need, the culpability in his conduct is contained solely in the wantonness or recldessness with
which he formulated his belief. The new legislation proposes
to have his criminal liability measured in accordance with these
mental states. This approach is substantially more rational than
that which presently exists.
C. Complicity Liability
In this chapter the common law doctrine of parties is eliminated. This change should serve to remove a substantial
source of confusion and, at the same time, better equip courts
to evaluate complicity liability on a more fundamental basis,
namely, whether the accused, with an appropriate state of
mind, contributed in some way to the commission of an offense. 10

2

Previous efforts to define complicity liability (meaning by this
criminal responsibility imputed from a principal offender to an
accomplice) have involved, at least to some extent, a categorization
of offenders as principals, aiders and abettors, accessories before
the fact, and accessories after the fact. Yet, for many years these
labels have been without any functional value whatsoever. Quite
properly, as indicated in the above quotation, the new Code discards these concepts and takes a fresh approach to this problem.
It recognizes that issues which arise in the area of imputed
liability are principally issues of mental culpability. This is reflected most prominently in the central complicity provision:
(1) A person is guilty of an offense committed by another
person when, with the intention of promoting or facilitating
the commission of the offense, he:
161 LRC § 455, Commentary.
162 Id. at 27.
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(a) Solicits or commands such other person to commit the offense; or
(b) Aids, counsels, or attempts to aid such person in
planning or committing the offense; or
(c) Having a legal duty to prevent the commission of
the offense, fails to make proper effort to do so.
(2) When causing a particular result is an element of an
offense, a person who acts with the kind of culpability with
respect to the result that is sufficient for the commission of
the offense is guilty of that offense when he:
(a) Solicits another person to engage in the conduct
causing such result; or
(b) Aids, counsels, or attempts to aid another person
in planning, or engaging in the conduct causing such result; or
(c) Having a legal duty to prevent the conduct caus63
ing the result, fails to make a proper effort to do so.1
The discussion of this provision which follows is limited in scope
to a small segment of complicity liability, that of imputing criminal responsibility to an individual because of his participation
in a criminal conspiracy. It is only with respect to this matter
that the Code has accomplished an important change in the law.
In one situation involving this type of accomplice liability the
law has experienced no prior difficulty. It involves this set of
circumstances: Two or more offenders conspire to commit an
offense. One of their number successfully accomplishes the
conspiratorial objective. Despite the fact that the conduct which
constitutes the offense can be attributed to only one of the conspirators all are criminally responsible for the underlying crime.'6 4
Subsection (1) of the foregoing provision codifies this principle.
Where the offense committed is a specific objective of the conspiratorial agreement each of the conspirators will have intended
to promote the commission of that offense. In a second situation
involving imputed liability through conspiratorial activity, however, the problem has been substantially more difficult. It arises
when one of a number of conspirators, while pursuing the objective of a conspiracy, departs from the conspiratorial agreement
163
164

KYPC § 22 [KRS § 433B.2-020].
Combs v. Commonwealth, 25 S.W. 276 (Ky. 1894).
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and commits a crime not contemplated by the others. The difficulty in imputing liability for this offense to all of the conspirators results from an inability to establish an intention on
their part to promote its commission.
The manner in which Kentucky law has attempted to resolve
this problem cannot be described with ease. The governing principle seems to be the following:
When individuals associate themselves in an unlawful enterprise, an act done by one in pursuance of a conspiracy is the
act of all and extends to such results as are the natural and
probable consequences of such act, even though such consequences were not specifically intended as a part of the
original plan. 165
On occasion the Court of Appeals has provided additional refinement of this principle. It has said that natural and probable
consequences are those which "should have been necessarily and
reasonably anticipated" to flow from completion of the conspiratorial objective. 66 With this refinement the Kentucky rule
is not distinguishable from a more widely held view that
originated with the United States Supreme Court. In a leading
decision on imputed liability this Court held that all participants
in a conspiracy could be convicted of any offense committed in
67
furtherance of that conspiracy.1
This approach to complicity liability in the conspiracy situation
is far from satisfactory. It is defective in at least two respects.
The most significant one is the fact that it serves to impose a kind
of absolute liability. When an offense outside a conspiratorial
agreement is committed by one of the conspirators, and is deemed
to have been committed in furtherance of the conspiracy, responsibility of the other conspirators for this offense is virtually
automatic. Their individual culpability with respect to the offense
is legally insignificant. In this way individual conspirators may
be convicted of crimes for which they do not have the requisite
mental state. The second major defect in this approach is its
failure to provide for a differentiation in the criminality of individual conspirators for an offense committed in furtherance of
Simmons v. Commonwealth, 92 S.W.2d 68, 70 (Ky. 1936).
1 Commonwealth v. Walters, 266 S.W. ]066, 1069 (Ky. 1924).
167 Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
165
66
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a conspiracy. A typical situation can be used to illustrate: several
offenders conspire to commit the robbery of a business establishment. During the course of the robbery one of the participants
intentionally kills a bystander. His culpable mental state would
justify a conviction of murder. Presumably all of the other conspirators would be guilty of the same offense, if the killing can
be said to have occurred as a natural and probable consequence
of the conspiracy. This result would follow notwithstanding that
their culpability with respect to the death is substantially different from that of the principal offender. As a matter of fact it
would follow even though their culpable mental state ordinarily
would be insufficient to support a conviction of even the lowest
degree of homicide.
The Code takes a different approach to the matter of imputed
liability for participation in a conspiracy. It eliminates the notion
that such participation is an automatic basis for imposing sanctions. Substituted in its place is the idea that each conspirator's
liability should be determined through an evaluation of his mental
state as it relates to the offense committed during the course of
the conspiracy. The practical impact of this change has been
described in this way:
The following example serves to demonstrate: D agrees
with another person to commit an armed robbery. During the
course of this robbery a third person is killed by D's cohort.
If D and his co-conspirator had agreed as a part of the conspiracy to kill anyone interfering with their endeavor, he
could be convicted. . . of intentional murder. In the absence
of such an agreement his liability must depend upon what the
decision makers find his state of mind to have been with regard to the resulting death. If, from all of the circumstances,
they find that he acted with [wantonness] manifesting extreme
indifference, he is guilty . .. of murder; if they find that he
acted with recklessness manifesting no such indifference, he
is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree. On the other
hand, if they find that be had no culpability with regard to the
death, he is not guilty of any charge involving homicide, notwithstanding the existence of the conspiracy to rob. 68
168 LRC § 310, Commentary.
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707

As indicated by this statement, the two major defects in previous
doctrine have been eliminated. There is no possibility of criminal
liability in the absence of mental culpability. And differentiation
in the treatment of individual conspirators is not just possible but
required when justified by the circumstances. This means that
guilt in this situation is no longer vicarious. It is personal with
respect to each offender, as it should be.

